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Renorming Labour Law: Can We Escape Labour
Law’s Recurring Regulatory Dilemmas?
Eric Tucker*

ABSTRACT

Historically, protective labour law pushed back against capitalist labour markets
by facilitating workers’ collective action and setting minimum employment standards
based on social norms. Although the possibilities, limits and desirability of such a
project were viewed differently in classical, Marxist and pluralist political economy,
each perspective understood that the pursuit of protective labour law would produce
recurring regulatory dilemmas requiring trade-offs between efficiency, equity and
voice and/or between workers’ and employers’ interests. Recently, some scholars
have argued that labour law needs to be renormed in ways that are market constituting
rather than market constraining and that this change would avoid regulatory dilemmas.
This article reviews the concept of regulatory dilemmas as formulated in the three major
traditions of labour law scholarship, critically assesses recent work by Deakin and
Wilkinson and by Hyde that proposes to renorm labour law and overcome
regulatory dilemmas and proposes an alternative approach to understanding
regulatory dilemmas based on the work of Wright.

1.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of a regulatory dilemma is built on the model a zero-sum
*
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game in which one party’s interests or goals can only be advanced at the
expense of another’s. In the context of labour law, a regulatory dilemma
typically arises when law that protects worker interests comes at the expense
of employer interests although, as we shall see, it may also be articulated as a
conflict between equity and voice on the one hand and efficiency on the other.
The extent to which regulatory dilemmas are pervasive in labour and
employment law and the reasons why they occur are the subjects of this article.1
There are widely divergent views on this topic. One view, developed by Karl
Polanyi, is that labour law’s regulatory dilemmas are recurring and are rooted in
the contradictory position of labour in market societies. On the one hand, labour
is bought and sold everyday in the labour market, thus confirming its commodity
status. On the other, labour is unlike other commodities: it is not produced for the
market, it cannot be stored and it cannot be separated from its bearer. Because of
its ineradicable social and human character, it is a ‘special’ or ‘fictive’ commodity.
Recurring dilemmas arise in protective labour law’s efforts to navigate this
contradictory position. When social formations allow labour to be treated as if it
were purely a commodity, strictly through market ordering, dysfunctional social
consequences result, which produce a movement to socially re-embed labour
markets in ways that recognize and respond to its human character. This entails its
partial decommodification. However, significant decommodification of labour will
be met by opposing pressures brought by those who benefit from laissez-faire labour
market policies. In short, the commodification/decommodification or protection/
liberalization dialectic is constant and ineradicable in market societies. Only in the
context of a second great transformation, would the dialectic be resolved.2
Polanyi’s formulation provides a helpful starting point, but it contains a
number of ambiguities in regards to the dynamics of market societies and the
possibility of creating stable embedded market economies.3 These matters are

more precisely addressed in neo-classical and Marxist political economist
frameworks that, despite their differences, both agree that within capitalist
market economies, labour law, conceived as a protective and re-distributional
project, will come at a cost either to economic efficiency (neo-classical
economics) or to the ability of employers to advance their interests
(Marxism). These costs are the source of recurring regulatory dilemmas,
which will ultimately limit protective labour law’s advance. A third
framework, pluralist political economy, which also locates itself within
capitalist market economies, takes a different approach that allows for
positive compromises in which the interests of workers and employers are
aligned so that protective labour law does not always come at the expense
of efficiency or employer interests. However, pluralists also recognize that there
is a limit to reform beyond which conflict will reappear and regulatory
dilemmas will recur. Balanced trade-offs then become the prescribed order of
the day.
Regulatory dilemmas have been sharply felt by supporters of workers’ rights
in the past several decades as a result of the rise of neo-liberalism, which has
unleashed market forces at the expense of regulatory protection. Although
marked by uneven development, the general trend has been toward a
recommodification of labour achieved through a weakening of collective
bargaining and minimum standards laws, both by formal amendment and by
more indirect means. These include diminished enforcement and the
promotion of economic policies that intensify competitive pressures on
employers, leading many to pursue labour strategies that limit and sometimes
violate their contractual and legal obligations to workers and that erode
normative standards previously accepted in the labour market. This
phenomenon has been aptly described in the North-American context as the

gloves-off economy.4 These developments can be readily explained by the
neoclassical and Marxist perspective, and may also be understood by
disappointed pluralists on the basis that the space for positive gains through
cooperation has been narrowed by processes of globalization and technological
change.5
Given this rather dismal picture, it is not surprising that labour lawyers,
particularly those operating within the pluralist frame, are particularly motivated
to consider whether there are ways out of labour law’s recurring dilemmas. Can
labour law be renormed and reformed to provide a way to improve the quality
of workers’ lives within the constraints of capitalist market economies?
Recently, several scholars have responded to this challenge by arguing that,
indeed, there is a way forward. For example, inspired by Amartya Sen’s work,
Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson (D&W) have advanced claims that by
renorming labour law around the human capabilities approach a different
agenda for labour law will emerge that can be implemented without running
up against a conflicting commodification imperative. In a similar vein,Alan
Hyde has applied game theory to argue that by renorming labour law around
the goal of overcoming collective action problems that cause market failure we
can both advance the goals of labour protection and redistribution without
having to regulate against the market.6
The goal of this intervention is 3-fold. First, I will more fully articulate
the major formulations of labour law’s recurring dilemmas. While the neoclassical argument is well known, I want to explore more deeply the
classic Marxist account, which I think presents both a better explanation of
regulatory dilemmas and a more troubling one for pluralists engaged in the
renorming project. I also examine pluralist political economy, which can be
seen as an attempt partially to liberate the project of protective labour law from

the recurring dilemmas posited by neo-classical and classic Marxist political
economy, while still acknowledging that protective labour law’s ambitions
are bounded by the need to balance competing demands for efficiency and
protection. The second part of the paper will critically examine the
renorming project, focusing on the work of D&W and Hyde who, I argue,
seek to advance the pluralist agenda by challenging the neo-classical account
of regulatory dilemmas while largely ignoring the Marxist account. This leads
them to express what I argue is an unfounded optimism about the possibilities
of reconstructing markets without confronting the property and social
relations that underlie actually existing capitalist labour markets. Hence, I
argue there is a compelling need to bring capitalism back into the analysis.7
In the third section, I attempt to begin such an account through a neoMarxist account of labour law’s recurring regulatory dilemmas inspired by
the work of Erik Olin Wright, which incorporates the insights of Marxist class
analysis, game theory and neo-institutionalism to produce a more promising
way to think about the dynamics of and possibilities for protective labour law
within capitalist social formations. In the conclusion, I offer suggestions for
further work on the project.

2. LABOUR LAW’S RECURRING DILEMMAS IN (NEO)-CLASSICAL, CLASSIC MARXIST AND
PLURALIST POLITICAL ECONOMIES

A. (Neo)-Classical Political Economy
Classical political economy begins from the premise that labour is a
commodity.8 As Alchian and Allen put it in their economics text, under the

heading, ‘Labor Service is a Commodity’,‘“Labor is not a commodity” is a battle
cry of some labor groups. Whatever its emotional appeal, the assertion is
misleading. Labor service is bought and sold daily’.9 From the perspective of
classical political economy, the labour market is viewed as a realm of
freedom and voluntarism in which profit seeking and willing buyers of labour
service meet willing sellers seeking to maximize their income. They strike deals
in their own best interest, constrained only by supply and demand curves.10
From this perspective, the price of labour, like all other commodities, reflects
its economic cost. If wages fall below the standard of necessity for its
reproduction, a shortage of labour relative to demand will result and wages
will get bid up because of competition among buyers of labour service. If
wages rise above the standard of necessity, a labour surplus will develop and
wages will get bid back down due to competition among labour service
sellers. This dynamic will keep wages, the price of labour, within the
appropriate market-clearing range.
As well, because purchasers of labour service are profit maximizers, they
will constantly be seeking to improve productivity by reducing the cost of
inputs per unit of output. Increases in productivity can be achieved in a
variety of ways, including the intensification of labour or the substitution of
machinery for labour. If the costs of meeting the standard of necessity go down
because of productivity increases, then, according to classical political economy,
so too should the wages of workers since competition for jobs will increase as a
result of decreased demand for labour service. However, a new equilibrium will
be reached around the now diminished cost of the standard of necessity.
The smooth operation of the market is, of course, premised on perfect
information and zero transaction costs, and although classical political
economists acknowledge that real labour markets operate imperfectly, the

imperfections are not viewed as so severe that they prevent the model from
being a close enough approximation of actual labour markets to be of
descriptive and prescriptive value.
What can cause disequilibrium, however, are non-market forces, one of
which would be protective labour law that either facilitates collective
bargaining that raises labour’s bargaining leverage by reducing competition
among individual sellers of labour power or sets minimum standards above
market-clearing terms and conditions of employment. Both moves would grant
labour a premium insofar as they would re-allocate to labour a greater share of
socially produced wealth than its economic cost as determined by the market.
From the classical political economy perspective, however, either tactic
would be counter productive. For example, if minimum wage laws raise
wages above market clearing levels, the price of goods will increase resulting
in a decrease in consumer demand, a reduction in production levels and
unemployment (the scale effect). Alternatively, employers facing higher wage
costs may substitute capital for labour (the substitution effect) in order to
reduce production costs, again resulting in decreased employment. Since
competition among workers cannot legally bid wages back down to market
clearing levels, unemployment will persist. To use another example, laws that
tolerate or foster workers’ collective action, which reduces wage competition,
will cause wages being bid up above their economic value, again resulting in
unemployment either because of reduced demand or the substitution of capital
for labour. The only difference here is that unemployment will increase
competitive pressures and make it more difficult for labour to sustain quasimonopoly wages through collective action.
The above examples make labour law’s regulatory dilemma stark and
obvious. Labour law conceived of as a project to raise terms and conditions

of employment above market clearing levels either by setting legally
enforceable minimum standards or by strengthening workers’ bargaining
power

through

collective bargaining legislation necessarily produces

unintended adverse effects that will be visited on some groups of workers
whom the laws were intended to assist. Therefore, from the perspective of
classical political economy, the only sensible project that labour law can
pursue is to correct for market failures by, for example, providing labour
market information to workers and employers, operating employment
exchanges, etc. This view is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Neo-classical Model of Regulatory Dilemmas.

The line is curvilinear because it is assumed that minor protective
and redistributive measures will be less efficiency impairing than stronger
protective measures. It is also assumed that there will be a limit to protective
labour law because as efficiency is increasingly impaired more workers,
employers and consumers will suffer. As a result, protective labour law will
become unpopular and unstable, and will be halted or rolled back since it was

a mistaken policy to begin with, and one that only benefited a small number of
labour market insiders at the expense of outsiders. Thus, the equilibrium
point will tend to be in the upper left quadrant.

B. Classic Marxist Political Economy
The view of labour law’s recurring dilemmas from Marxist political
economy accepts some of the claims of classical political economy, but
departs from it in fundamental ways.11 Marx understood that, from the
perspective of capital, labour was indeed a commodity, not different in
principle from a machine, which had to be purchased at its economic cost.12
However, unlike classical political economy which, at least in its more
Malthusian moments, depended on population movements to respond to the
over or under-supply of labour, Marx substituted the concept of the reserve
army of labour—a relative population surplus. As Marx explained, faced with
an increase in the demand for labour, capital could not wait for the
population to increase to bring up the supply and bring wages back down.
Rather, capital had the option of substituting capital for labour, thereby
producing

unemployment—a

relative

surplus

population—that

would

increase competition among workers and reduce wages. Thus, for Marx, the
reserve army of labour played a crucial role in keeping supply and demand ‘on
the right lines’. This analysis, however, remained entirely within the bounds of
classical political economy.13
Unlike classical political economy, which portrayed the labour market as
a realm of freedom, Marx had a very different analysis, based on the view
that

the commodification

of labour

within capitalism resulted in its

exploitation and constituted a barrier to free human development. As a
result, the gains that workers could hope to make within capitalism were
limited; the achievement of human freedom required transformative change. It
is to this other side of Marxist political economy, then, that we must turn to
understand its theorization of recurring dilemmas.
Marx’s ontological starting point, expressed most clearly in his early works,
is that of human beings having their own need for development, which they
realize in nature and through social activity. ‘Man is directly a natural being. As
a natural being, and as a living natural being he is, on the one hand, endowed
with natural powers and faculties, which exist in him as tendencies and
abilities, as drives . . .. The objects of his drives exist outside himself as objects
which are indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his faculties’.14
For capital, and from the perspective of classical political economy, which
treats workers as commodities, their humanity is denied. ‘Political economy
does not deal with him in his free time, as a human being, but leaves this aspect
to the criminal law, doctors, religion, statistical tables, politics and the workhouse beadle’.15
Additionally, Marx went beyond classical political economy through his
theory of surplus value, which he defined as the difference between the
economic value of labour—its necessary cost of production—and the value
produced by labour, which was appropriated by capital as profit. The
extraction and appropriation of surplus labour by capital constituted the
economic foundation of labour’s exploitation.16
The commodification of labour and its exploitation under capitalism put
labour and capital in fundamental conflict. On the one hand, capital’s
imperative to treat labour as a commodity is inconsistent with the labourer’s
need to develop him or herself as a rich multi-faceted human being. Workers,

therefore, will resist their commodification. On the other hand, because social
production yields a surplus, and because that creates the possibility for
workers to raise their standard of living—to increase their level of
necessity and human development—labour opposes capital’s drive to
appropriate that surplus for itself and seeks to increase its share. Thus, from
within Marxist political economy, class struggle plays a central role in the
degree to which work is humanized and in the definition and redefinition of
workers’ living standards, both of which significantly determine the scope for
workers to develop themselves as full human beings.
These dynamics can be more closely examined by following the
worker through the circuit of capital. For the propertyless worker, her own
productive capacities cease to be use values since they cannot be exercised
directly in the material world. They only have value when sold as commodities
to those who own a means of production on which labour power can be
productively employed. Thus, workers must enter into the sphere of
exchange, the capitalist labour market, where as commodity sellers they find
themselves in competition against each other. Moreover, propertyless workers
operate in a buyers’ market because of the reserve army of labour, which is
constituted and retained by the ability of capital to substitute machinery for
labour or to withdraw from the market entirely if the price of labour is
driven too far upwards. Workers do not have the same substitution and exit
options available to them, since they are deprived of access to alternative
ways to secure a livelihood other than by the sale of their labour power and
typically do not have the resources to sustain themselves and their families, let
alone to flourish, while they stay out of the labour market.17 To offset this
imbalance, workers must combine to reduce competition or to make the state
their agency for overcoming their collective action problems, imposing

minimum employment standards or providing social welfare that reduces
their exclusive dependence on the labour market to gain access to the
resources they need to sustain themselves.18
As the employer and the worker leave the labour market and enter the
sphere of production, the workplace, the employer enters as owner of the
worker’s capacity to work, which he now has authority to deploy for the
purposes of producing goods and services that can be realized on the market for
a profit.19 The worker, of course, cannot be separated from the commodity
labour power that has been sold, and so for the employer to extract use value
from the commodity that he has purchased, the will of the worker must be
subordinated to the will of the master. Production is organized to realize profit,
not to satisfy the workers’ need for development and self-realization.
However, because workers are not simply commodities and have their own
needs, they will push back to assert some control over the labour process. Yet
here too struggle will occur on uneven terrain because of capital’s greater
economic

freedom. To

the

extent

that

workers’

resistance

to

their

commodification in the production process conflicts with their employers’ drive
for profit, workers will only succeed through combination to reduce
competition or the imposition of limits on their commodification at work
through legally enforceable minimum standards.
Finally, the employer owns the products of labour, which exist for the
capitalist as use values that have no use, but that must be sold as
commodities for their value to be realized. For capital, the only use values
that will be produced are those for which there is a reasonable expectation that
they can be sold at a profit. Workers confront the products of their labour
now as commodities, produced not for the purpose of satisfying their
socially developed needs and wants, but for profitable sale. Needs that do

not translate into effective demand—that is needs that are not backed by
purchasing power—do not register on the market. Moreover, capital heavily
invests in efforts to shape workers’ needs in an effort to align their consumer
‘choices’ with the products they wish to sell.20 The linkages between sales
driven consumption and human development become increasingly tenuous
beyond a certain point and further reinforce workers’ dependency on the sale of
their capacity to work.
Thus, at each phase in the circuit of capital, the need of workers for
selfdevelopment confronts the logic of capital, which seeks to reduce
workers to commodity sellers in competition with each other, to exercise
control over their productive capacities, to shape their needs and to appropriate
for themselves the surplus value that is realized in the social process of
production.
We will come back later to ask how, within this scheme, one can talk
about capitalism as a system within which the development of human
capabilities can be given priority, but for now we want to turn our attention to
the implications of this analysis for a Marxist understanding of the recurring
dilemmas for protective labour law, conceived of as a project to redistribute
more of the socially produced wealth to labour and to humanize the production
process, through the promotion of collective action or imposition of minimum
standards.
As we have noted, Marxist political economy recognizes that workers
are not reducible to commodities; that they can exercise agency and act as a
class economically through combination and politically to use the state as an
agency to facilitate collective action or to establish minimum standards higher
than those that will be produced in a competitive labour market. But Marxist
political economy also takes the view that the project of constructing

protective and redistributive labour law will be resisted by capital. Labour
pushes in one direction, capital in the other. Labour pushes to increase its
standard of living by appropriating for itself a greater share of the socially
produced wealth in order to satisfy its unmet need for development; capital
pushes back to maintain or expand its rate of profit. Labour pushes to humanize
work; capital pushes back if the result is a decrease in productivity, etc. But what
determines where the line will be drawn? Is it a matter of supply and demand
curves and market forces? How, if at all, does Marxist political economy
differently theorize labour law’s recurring dilemma from that of classical
political economy?
Most fundamentally, Marxist political economy departs from classical
political economy by putting workers’ agency and humanity, their drive
through class struggle to satisfy their unmet needs, at the centre of the
story rather than a naturalized labour market which produces terms and
conditions of employment based on the economic value of labour services. The
labour market is viewed as a social institution produced and shaped by class
struggle. The necessary costs to reproduce labour are not biologically
determined (except perhaps in the last instance), but rather reflect the
standard of living that workers have become accustomed to through
previous struggles. Thus, in this account, there clearly is scope for protective
labour law to operate outside the iron law of the market postulated by
classical political economy, but it will depend on the balance of power
between labour and capital.
That said Marx also recognized that the ability of labour to use the state
to extract a greater share of socially produced wealth or to transform the
labour process in a manner that better respected workers’ needs for
development was limited by the imbalance in class forces that is perpetuated

by capitalism. That imbalance, as noted previously, is rooted structurally in
capitalist property relations that create an asymmetrical dependency between
labour and capital, which can also be translated into a greater ability to
influence the state by virtue of capital’s greater resources, fewer collective
action problems and state dependency on the economy for resources.21
The resulting view of recurring dilemmas is depicted in Figure 2. It too
assumes a curvilinear path on the assumption that modest protective labour
laws that only lightly impinge on employers’ interests will be easier to
achieve than stronger laws, which will be more vigorously resisted by
employers and thus will take increasingly more worker power to obtain.
Moreover, it also assumes that within capitalism, there is a limit to the power
that workers can obtain so that there is a structural limit to the reforms that can
be achieved.
The Marxist view of recurring dilemmas is similar to that reached in
classical political economy in that the dilemmas arise from the outset, are
constant, and ultimately limiting in terms of what is possible. However, the
dynamic is very different, because in Marxist political economy the strength
of protective labour law at any given time depends on the balance of
power between employers and workers, rather than economic efficiency and
laws of supply and demand. This difference is important because it allows
more scope for the development of protective labour law within capitalism
than does classical political economy and because it contemplates that
another world is both desirable and possible. However, within capitalism, the
balance of power tilts in favour of employers and workers are engaged in an
uphill battle. Each increment of labour protection will require marginally
greater worker strength and the scope of labour protection that can be
achieved within capitalism is, therefore, finite.

This Marxist account of recurring dilemmas, however, is both classic
and abstract. I will return later to consider a neo-Marxist account that
arguably is better able to take into account the historically specific ways in
which class power is institutionalized and to consider the possibility that under
certain circumstances class cooperation can be in the mutual interests of labour
and capital.

Figure 2. Classic Marxist Model of Regulatory Dilemmas.

C. Pluralist Political Economy
The pluralist paradigm, or what I am calling pluralist political
economy, is the third major framework for theorizing labour law’s
recurring dilemmas. This framework has exerted great influence on North
American and English labour policy at various times, particularly in the
post-World War II era, and continuing at least into the 1980s, when the
neo-liberal approach (heir

to

classical

political

economy)

became

ascendant. As with the other two frames, there are numerous variations
of pluralist political economy. Indeed,

it is arguably the case that

pluralism is more pluralistic in its theoretical commitments than the
other frameworks we have examined 22 and there are distinct differences
between the English and the American pluralist traditions refl the

very

different paths of industrial relations policy development in the two
countries.
The English variant of pluralism was developed in the work of Otto
KahnFreund, Allan Flanders, Hugh Clegg and the early Alan Fox and was
projected into the work and recommendations of the influential Donovan
Commission

(1965–68).23 Several common assumptions informed their

approach. Industrial

confl was accepted as being normal and legitimate,

provided that it remained within certain limits; employers and unions
exercised countervailing powers in the labour market so that collective
bargaining could be counted upon to produce fair and mutually acceptable
outcomes and the role of the state was to promote voluntary relationships
and appropriate institutional arrangements rather than to legislate procedures
or substantive outcomes. Given this view, the issue of recurring regulatory
dilemmas did not figure prominently in the work of English pluralists, since
the state’s role was limited. In a balanced labour market with appropriate
institutional arrangements, the common interests of

employers and

employees would advance together, albeit not without some marginal
conflict over distributive concerns and work organization issues.
The North-American variant of industrial pluralism developed earlier, in
the first two decades of the 20th century, as a conscious response to the neoclassical and Marxist approaches, by institutional economists, led by John R.
Commons.24 Moreover, American industrial pluralism began to develop at a

time when labour unions and collective bargaining had not been as well
institutionalized as they had been in Great Britain and which ultimately
required compulsory legislation, in the form of the Wagner Act, to become
more fully established as a mechanism for regulating industrial relations. As
well, the creation of a minimum standards regime for the unorganized was
also seen as a necessary supplement to the collective bargaining regime. For
these reasons, the theme of regulatory dilemmas was much more salient for
North American than for British industrial pluralists, and so we will focus our
attention on their work. However, the British turn toward more direct state
involvement in labour market regulation since the Thatcher era makes this
discussion directly relevant to their situation, as does the New Labour discourse
on the compatibility of workplace fairness and economic efficiency and its
emphasis on juridified collective bargaining and individual employment
rights.25
For the purposes of discussing North-American pluralism, it is useful to
draw on an article by Budd, Gomez and Meltz that aims to provide a fully
developed theoretical foundation for the pluralist industrial relations model:26
The fundamental theoretical assumptions of pluralist industrial relations are that
(1) there is a conflict of interest in the employment relationship, (2) labor markets are
not perfectly competitive, and (3) employees are human beings, not simply commodities
or factors of production.

The contrast to classical political economy is obvious insofar as pluralists
reject the view that labour is reducible to a commodity and that labour market
outcomes are presumptively efficient or fair. If, as Bruce Kaufman has
recently argued, labour markets only exist because of positive transaction
costs, then the very assumption of near-zero transaction costs in neo-classical

accounts of actually existing labour markets dissolves the basis for the
existence of the institution they are studying. Once positive transaction costs
and information asymmetries are recognized as the norm and not the
exception, a claim that has ample support in institutional economics, then it
becomes possible, indeed necessary, to examine the role of other institutions,
including unions and protective labour law, in improving economic efficiency.27
What is less obvious from this statement of theoretical premises is
the difference between pluralism and Marxist political economy, which
arguably could also be said to embrace each of these three theoretical
assumptions. The crucial disagreement is over the sources of conflicts of
interest and the extent to which they can be reconciled through institutional
adjustments. The pluralist perspective certainly recognizes conflicting or
competing interests: workers want higher wages, job security and safe work,
while employers want lower labour costs, flexibility and high output.28 Yet
pluralists also emphasize that workers and employers have shared interests in
productive workers, profitable employers and a healthy economy and that these
common interests can be satisfied in a capitalist market economy.
Thus, it might be argued that, from a pluralist perspective, labour
law’s protective project—raising wages, providing job security, giving
workers voice etc.—encounters a regulatory dilemma only when its effect is to
reduce economic efficiency or impair employer profitability, and only then
will hard choices have to be made about the trade-offs involved in pushing
the project forward, maintaining the status quo or retreating. The crucial
question is how much room is there for cooperation? A pessimistic pluralist
would see relatively little scope for mutual gains and conclude that equity and
efficiency trade-offs are the norm. This pessimistic view is depicted in Figure 3.
There is, however, a much more optimistic version of pluralism that sees

far greater scope for mutual gains and thus pushes the point of conflicting
interests, and the resulting recurring dilemmas it produces, deeper into the
background. In

part, this

is

achieved

through

the

pluralists’

pre-

commitment to capitalist social relations. Unlike Marxist political economy,
which interrogates the basis of workers’ interest in these ‘shared’ goals, and
roots them in their asymmetrical dependence on capital, pluralist political
economy takes capitalist relations of

Figure 3. Pluralist Models of Regulatory Dilemmas.

production, at the very least, as a neutral fact of life, and more often as a
positive foundation for the efficient production of goods and services. As a
result, the

material basis for conflict is minimized. Indeed, in most

institutionalized forms of pluralism the pursuit of objectives that challenge
capitalist relations of production is characterized as irresponsible, and not to
be condoned. The goals of labour law are thus narrowed to objectives for

which mutual gains are most likely to be available or at least conflict will be
less fundamental.29
Not only do pluralists minimize the extent to which conflict is inherent in
the employment relation, they identify another source for it: imperfectly
competitive markets. These imperfections do not operate neutrally as
between

worker

and

employers, but rather systematically advantage

employers by giving them quasimonopolistic power that is exercised to
impose low wages and poor working conditions. ‘From this theoretical
perspective, laws and unions are viewed as mechanisms for levelling the
playing field between employers and employees, thereby promoting the
optimal operation of markets rather than interfering with it’.30
This more optimistic version of pluralist political economy is premised on
an empirical argument that taking workers’ humanity into account and
providing voice and equity enhances economic efficiency and, therefore, is in
the interests not only of workers but also of employers, at both the microand
macro levels. Thus high-performance work practices at the firm level and
protective and redistributive labour law at the national level should be
preferred by both employers and employees over their alternatives. This
optimistic view is also presented in Figure 3.
At times, Budd et al.’s discussion of the optimistic version of a pluralist
political economy seems to assume that the concept of recurring dilemmas has
little or no place, as if the advancement of voice and equity is always efficiency
enhancing. However, Budd et al. do not actually make this claim. Indeed, in
his 2004 book, Budd explicitly states, ‘The basic objectives of efficiency, equity,
and voice can be complementary, but they often are in conflict’ and in his coauthored 2009 book he goes further and states that they ‘more often’ clash.31
After all, if there were no conflicts between efficiency, equity and voice, then

the very idea of balance would be redundant since all interests would run in the
same direction. When and where these dilemmas occur and how they are
resolved is another issue, but for present purposes the important point is that
even within this optimistic version of pluralist political economy, while there is
ample room for labour law’s normative project to be realized in a manner that is
consistent with economic efficiency and employers’ interests, there is a limit to
positive cooperation and beyond that point regulatory dilemmas will recur.32

3.

NEO-PLURALISM: RENORMING AND REFORMING LABOUR LAW FOR THE TWENTY-

FIRST CENTURY?

This section begins by asking why it is that a number of scholars, particularly
ones working in the pluralist tradition, are attempting at this juncture to redefine
labour law’s project. If the optimistic version of pluralist political economy was
holding, presumably there would be little incentive for such a re-thinking. The
common interests of employees and employers should have led to the
establishment and stabilization a labour law regime within which humane
workplaces that provided for equity and voice flourished in advanced
capitalist economies generally, and especially in North America where
pluralist prescriptions for state labour policy held considerable sway in the
decades after World War II. Yet we know that the golden age of industrial
relations, such as it was, has passed: income distributions have become
increasingly unequal;33 and the share of the GDP that goes to wages has
decreased while the share that goes to profits has increased.34 We also know
that employers have increasingly resorted to a variety of forms of
precarious employment, including temporary, part-time and self-employment,

all of which have undermined the effectiveness of existing labour protection
laws and undoubtedly have contributed to the trends described.35 While it is true
that some employers have taken a higher road and adopted high-performance
workplace models, the evidence on the benefits of this transition for workers
is decidedly mixed.36
Even more important for this discussion is that in recent years protective
labour law has utterly failed to sustain, let alone promote, collective
representation. Trade union density, particularly in the private sector, has
declined in most countries.37 In the USA, the collective bargaining
legislation has ossified and employer violations of existing laws have
become rampant,38 while in Canada

labour law has been weakened,

particularly as a result of the shift from card check to election-only certification
procedures and ineffective remedies for employer unfair labour practices.39 As
well, the North-American performance in regard to labour standards has
been generally dismal, notwithstanding some advances in some places in the
areas of occupational health and safety regulation and equity.40
The European story takes a somewhat different path, although the
direction of change is much the same. Here the picture is less one of
formal legal and institutional change (although not in the UK where the
Thatcher government actively undermined collective bargaining to great
effect), but rather one of more subtle and incremental alterations in the
operation of institutions resulting from processes of defection, drift and legal
reinterpretation that have produced increasing labour market dualism,
weakening the collective bargaining and protective rights regime for the
growing body of precarious workers, while often maintaining or even
increasing protection for core workers.41
Overall, these findings do not pose a challenge to neo-classical and

Marxist political economy.42 Rather, they are evidence that vindicates each
perspective, albeit for different reasons. For neo-classical political economists, it
is proof that the project of protective labour law is self-defeating to the extent
that it is not efficiency enhancing and that profit-maximizing employers will find
cheaper ways to produce if labour law attempts to drive up the cost of labour
power above its economic value. For Marxist political economy, the findings
reflect the shifts in class power and the success of capital’s neo-liberal project
of defeating the gains made by workers in the post-World War II period in
order ‘to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the
power of economic elites’.43 For pluralist political economy, however, not only
are these developments socially undesirable; they may also signal that the
space to achieve voice and equity without impairing efficiency is being
narrowed and regulatory dilemmas are becoming sharper, leading some
scholars who work in its tradition to reconsider the normative and empirical
foundations of their project and its prescriptive implications.
These developments intersect and overlap with the emergence of a challenge
to the traditional conception of labour law, conceived of as a project for
counteracting inequality of bargaining power and to instead focus broadly
on the economic and legal regulation of labour markets, without any strong
prior commitment to the goals of protective regulation. As Hugh Collins
noted, the strength of this alternative approach is that it expanded the scope of
labour law to include a wide range of work arrangements and government
policies that affect the supply and demand sides of the labour market, but its
weakness is the loss of a vocational centre.44
The work examined below has been selected because it can be viewed both
as a response to the crisis of the traditional protective model of labour law and
as a continuation of the labour market regulation alternative, with both its

strengths and weaknesses. The work is particularly interesting and
important precisely because the authors embrace a progressive vision for the
role of labour law within the confines of a largely untransformed political
economy.

A. D&W and the Capabilities Approach
The Law of the Labour Market (LLM) is a fascinating and challenging
book that ranges over a wide swath of labour history, policy and theory. In
their final chapter, D&W ask the question ‘whether a means can be found for
expressing the enduring values of labour law—including protection for the
person and security of the individual worker and respect for the autonomy of
collective organizations— within the framework of a market-based economic
system’. Interestingly, what this formulation of the enduring values of labour
law does not include is a reduction in unequal bargaining power or a more
egalitarian redistribution of income and wealth to labour.45 As well, the
authors do not name the market-based system within which labour law
operates as capitalism. These omissions are neither accidental nor insignificant.
D&W locate the challenges faced by labour law against the context of
the neo-liberal agenda—whose effects they identify much as I have—and
recognize the need to articulate a clear alternative. They explicitly reject older
versions of the pluralist model, which cast the project of labour law as one of
displacing or limiting market relations, particularly when the realization of
its redistributive norms entails a right to an income above labour’s market
value. Instead, like a number of other labour lawyers,46 D&W adopt
Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities, most popularly presented in his

Development as Freedom,47 and posit the central normative goal of labour law as
institutionalizing ‘forms of capabilities which provide individuals with the
means to realize the potential of their resource endowments and thereby achieve
a higher level of economic functioning’.48
Of course, renorming labour law around Sen’s capabilities approach does
not lead directly to any particular policy prescriptions, as D&W recognize.49
Indeed, it might be argued that at this level of abstraction, the capabilities
approach is as equally consistent with Marxist political economy as it is with
pluralism. In fact, some scholars have noted the affinity between Sen’s
capabilities approach and the young Marx’s ontology, which posits that human
beings have an internal need to realize themselves in a plurality of dimensions
and that they do so as social beings in their relations with others and the
natural world.50 However, for Marx, as we saw, capitalism simultaneously
generates the opportunity for greater human richness and freedom, because of
the increase in social wealth that it creates and constitutes a barrier to the
realization of human richness and freedom for most of the population by
separating workers from direct access to the means of production, thereby
depriving them of the ability to experience their capacities as use values,
requiring them to sell their capacities as commodities in competition with
other sellers of labour service, etc. From this perspective, capitalism and the
capitalist labour market are not realms of freedom in which workers can
develop and realize their rich human capacities, but rather are sites of
alienated labour in which workers’ capabilities are limited by the profitmaximizing decisions of employers who mediate between workers and
extract the benefits of social cooperation for themselves.
D&W do not address the Marxist critique of capitalism and its
implications for the capabilities approach. Indeed, the structural features of

capitalism never appear as a relevant analytic consideration in D&W’s work.
Rather their starting point is ‘the idea that the labour market, like other
markets, is a spontaneous order or self-governing system which ultimately
rests on a set of mutually reinforcing conventions which are themselves the
outcome of an evolutionary process’.51 D&W’s project, however, is not a
Hayekian one insofar as they argue that there is ample scope for legal
regulation and intervention in labour markets and that these formal measures
can change the parameters within which market conventions evolve.
However, they also want to avoid the trap of the previous generation of
social rights and pluralist prescriptions, which were premised on an
understanding that,to at least some non-trivial extent,protective and
redistributive labour law pushed back against the market, so that its normative
aspirations had to be balanced against efficiency concerns.52 The renorming of
labour law around the capabilities approach transcends rather than reinforces
the conflict famously noted by T. H. Marshall between social rights and a
dynamic market economy;53 D&W claim this is so because the capabilities
approach involves reconstituting the market order in ways that improve its
efficiency by converting individual resource endowments into capabilities that
enable individuals to participate more effectively and freely in the market. In
short, they make not only a normative or prescriptive argument about the
desirability of renorming labour law around a market-based capabilities
approach but a positive one as well: because the capabilities approach is
market constituting and not market limiting, it can be realized without class
conflict, provided that collective action problems can be overcome. This view
is consistent with the third-way industrial relations policy proclaimed by the
Blair government, encapsulated in the claim that ‘efficiency and fairness are
wholly compatible’.54 It is depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4. D&W’s View of the Capability Approach and Regulatory
Dilemmas.

The renorming of labour law around a market-based capabilities approach
is thus quite open-ended about the kinds of measures that it can justify. For
example, in their discussion of the limits of spontaneous orders, D&W ask
whether a market order can function effectively ‘in a situation in which there
are large and enduring disparities in the wealth and resources of market
participants?’55 D&W reject the neo-classical answer that it can, and instead,
build on an argument developed by Sugden who claims that redistribution ‘is
needed not to reverse the unpleasant results of the market, but rather to
provide the preconditions for the market working in the first place’. From this
perspective, D&W suggest ‘many of the redistributive and protective rules of
labour law have a market-creating function’.56
The capabilities approach, however, is not invoked primarily to justify the

traditional project of labour law, but rather to point toward a broader set of
policies. Thus, later in their discussion, D&W suggest that the capabilities
approach could be achieved by the provision of some combination of social
rights that guaranteed workers access to certain resources necessary to maintain
a minimum standard of living and economic security (eg, sick pay, maternity
pay, social welfare benefits) and to certain procedural rights (‘rules governing
workplace relations, collective bargaining and corporate governance’).57
The question to which I now want to return is whether D&W’s marketbased capabilities approach is likely to transcend the problem of recurring
dilemmas because its prescriptions are not market limiting but market
constituting and therefore will be in the interest of all market actors once
collective action problems are overcome. It is here that D&W’s refusal to
specify that they are not just dealing with a labour market but with a capitalist
market becomes significant. Although the content of the capabilities
approach may vary, it surely contains elements whose effect is to partially
decommodify labour by giving workers a significant measure of market
independence through state provision of social security, health care,
education, etc. Similarly, even if the capabilities approach does not entail
guaranteeing a final distribution of resources, but aims to increase effective
market functioning by protecting workers’ rights to engage in processes of
collective bargaining or to participate in corporate governance, it substantively
increases the bargaining power of labour relative to that of capital, at
least compared to world in which no such rights are present and in which
workers have not been able to achieve collective bargaining in the absence
of state support. In the abstract, it is true that these measures can be
described simply as ones that reconstitute the market on different terms.
But can it be said that these measures do not push back against capitalist

labour markets and, therefore, will not encounter resistance that will produce
regulatory dilemmas?
One answer to the question is to say that these moves are not
inconsistent with capitalism, but rather that they will produce a different variety
of capitalism. Here it will be useful to turn briefly to the varieties of capitalism
(VoC) literature, where the question of limits and dilemmas has been debated
more thoroughly. The VoC approach, most fully articulated in Hall and
Soskice, emphasizes the role of institutional arrangements in either
facilitating or impeding the abilities of political–economic actors to
coordinate among themselves and overcome collective action problems in
order

to

engage

in

mutually

beneficial

cooperation.

Institutional

complementarities across different spheres of political economy produce
two paradigmatic VoCs, coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal
market economies (LMEs). One is not necessarily more economically
successful than another, as each variety has its comparative advantages which
can yield different paths to success. However, the way economic success is
achieved and its benefits distributed, clearly has significance for the participants,
with CMEs providing more social protection and higher living standards for
workers.58 One can readily see the affi between a capabilities approach and
CMEs and, indeed, it is largely within CMEs that a capabilities approach has had
its greatest traction.59
Critics of the left have recognized the important contribution made by
the institutionalists to an understanding of the dynamics of capitalism. ‘[I]t
has always

been

a

virtue

of

institutional

political

economy

to

demonstrate the salience of alternate institutional arrangements, and sociotechnical evolution, for the variable ways that capitalist exchange relations
are grafted into social formations’.60 However, they have also been sharply

critical of its narrow focus on institutions to the virtual exclusion of political
economic structure. For example, Jonas Pontusson has criticized the VoC
approach for its emphasis on ‘varieties’ but its lack of attention to
‘capitalism’, which produces a focus in their work on issues of coordination
and efficiency at the expense of consideration of conflicts of class interest and
exercises of class power.61
This is not just a theoretical problem, according to Pontusson, but leads
VoC theorists to understate the extent to which common structural
pressures are pushing all advanced capitalist countries in the same direction—
towards neoliberalism— notwithstanding the variations in their paths. Thus, for
example, Pontusson points to general trends across both CMEs and LMEs
towards reductions in social protection and unemployment insurance and
growing labour market inequality. Moreover, he also argues that much of the
variation that can be found across advanced capitalist countries is better
explained by differences in working-class power, whether manifested in union
density or political influence.62
There is ample evidence from other sources that supports Pontusson’s
general conclusions. The OECD recently reported that income inequality
within OECD countries has been increasing at least since the mid-1980s in most
countries, with big increases recently in Canada, Germany, Norway, USA, Italy
and Finland.Although income poverty among the elderly fell, it increased
among young families with children. Government spending from the mid1980s to the mid-1990s dampened the rise in poverty, but amplified it in the
next decade, as benefits became less targeted on the poor.63
More recently, Wolfgang Streeck has written a compelling critique of the
foundational assumptions of the VoC approach. Using the transformation of
Germany, a key example of a CME, as his case study, Streeck demonstrates a

clear trend toward disorganization and liberalization that has entailed the
demise of institutions capable of subjecting economic actors to social obligations
and public responsibilities, leaving them free to pursue profit maximization. This
change, he argues, is not random, but rather is driven by the dynamics of
capitalism in which resourceful capitalist actors are relentlessly driven by
competition to undermine social constraints. According to Streeck, it is
fundamentally misconceived to treat capitalism ‘as a neutral apparatus for the
joint production of shared prosperity’.64
For our purposes, the critique of VoC undermines the validity of the
distinction that D&W make between market constituting and market
regulating. To paraphrase

Streeck, it would be a mistake to view the labour

market as a neutral apparatus that can be reconstituted to enhance capabilities
without

taking

into

account

the

specifically capitalist dynamics of

contemporary labour markets and the likelihood of resistance and evasion by
employers who are not driven to maximize social efficiency but rather profits.
In short, what might be market constituting law in a social engineer’s eyes, may
very well be experienced as market regulating law for economic actors for
whom such laws constitute a barrier to be overcome.
The salience of actually existing capitalism for the realization of the
capabilities approach becomes even more apparent when we compare the
social protection required to enhance capabilities with what is actually on offer.
The relation between growing labour market flexibility and the provision of
security has received a great deal of attention in Europe where the policy of
promoting flexicurity, the combination of flexibility and security has been
formally embraced. It is just the kind of policy that a market-based capabilities
approach should support because it poses fl and security ‘not . . . as opposites, but
as mutually supportive labour market components’.65 Indeed, fl

has

been

described ‘as a political strategy [that] promises to make an end to the old confl
between effi

y and equity’66 and, therefore, if realized, would bring an end to

labour law’s recurring dilemmas.
There is an immense literature on the subject of the implementation
of flexicurity, and clearly it has been more successful in some countries
(notably the Netherlands and Denmark) than in others.67 The vision of
flexicurity ending trade-offs and recurring dilemmas, however, seems utopian.
One recent empirical study found, that contrary to the goal of the flexicurity
strategy, there is ‘a positive correlation between aggregate flexibility and
aggregate precariousness of work all over Europe. No country fulfils the
flexicurity condition of high flexibility and low precariousness’.68 In the same
forum, a European trade union researcher concluded that the European
Commission’s concept of flexicurity ‘set flexibility above security, economic
goals above social ones and employers’ interests above those of workers’.69
Finally, a third study of flexicurity in Germany concluded that the best way to
characterize recent reforms was as flexibility-security tradeoffs, with
flexibility more strongly on the agenda than security.70 A preference for the
promotion of competitive efficiency and the maintenance of high rates of
employment over security will be particularly harmful to women who are
disproportionately concentrated in precarious forms of employment.71 The
point here is not that D&W support these contemporary examples of flexicurity;
they do not. Rather, it is that actually existing flexicurity practices provide further
evidence that it is unhelpful to present capability-enhancing regulation as a
neutral labour market constituting measure without taking into account the
dominant practices of actually existing capitalist regimes, which favour
flexibility for employers over security for workers, regardless of the form that
security takes. Moreover, this approach diverts our attention away from the

need for an analysis of the socioeconomic conditions under which greater
worker security can be achieved.
Finally, we might ask about the compatibility of job quality and worker
wellbeing, matters that also should be a central concern of the capabilities
approach. A recent study by Francis Green presents a decidedly mixed
assessment, noting that while in most developed capitalist nations wages and
skill requirements have increased, there has also been widespread intensification
of the work effort and a more mixed picture with regard to worker discretion.
Green’s overall assessment is that the quality of work life is strained and that
the reason for this is that ‘the employer’s interest is to extract the best
performance from workers, not to generate their maximum well-being’. He goes
on to say that ‘one has to hold to a very rosy ideology about capitalism’ to
accept a story that ‘in general the workplace is a “win-win” game, where what
is good for workers is always right for the firm’.72
These observations are not intended to establish that rising income
inequality is inevitable, that the flexicurity model must fail, that the quality of
work life is bound to deteriorate or that the capabilities approach cannot or
should not be pursued. Rather, they are made to challenge the claim of D&W
that conceiving of the capabilities approach as a market constituting strategy
avoids the recurring regulatory dilemmas of protective and redistributive
labour law. In short, this analysis suggests a second answer to the question
posed earlier—that the reconstitution of markets according to the capabilities
approach will, if pursued with any vigor, entail a pushing back against
actually existing capitalist labour markets, built on definite social and
property relations and a social logic of accumulation, which privileges the
owners of the means of production over those who sell their labour power.

B. Alan Hyde: Renorming Labour Law around Collective Action Problems
In a provocative article, Alan Hyde argued that labour law should be defined
as ‘the collection of regulatory techniques and values that are properly
applied to any market that, if left unregulated, will reach socially suboptimum outcomes because economic actors are individuated and cannot
overcome collective action problems’.73 In reaching this conclusion, Hyde
explicitly rejects the view that labour law should be defined as the pursuit of
values against the market, not because he does not care about normative
values, but rather for pragmatic reasons; not only is there a lack of agreement
over which non-market values should be pursued but also ‘because one would
expect employers to resist such humane, non-economic values strenuously, and
for law to have major problems in efficacy’.74 In that sense, he might be viewed
as a very pessimistic pluralist indeed. Although Hyde lists a number of market
failures that characterize labour markets—including inelasticity of supply,
collective action problems, low trust and opportunism that prevent the
formation

of

efficient

long-term

contracts,

inadequate

incentives

for

investment in human capital and information asymmetries—most of these are
addressed by overcoming collective action problems and so this becomes for
Hyde the primary goal for labour law. Like D&W, Hyde expressly stipulates that
so conceived, labour law does not act against the market. ‘When labour law
addresses . . . market failures, it does not stand against the market. It enables it’.75 If
true, the result of adopting such an approach would be to dissolve labour law’s
recurring regulatory dilemmas.
Hyde’s project might be viewed as pluralism stripped of its normative
goals of promoting voice and equity or redressing unequal bargaining power.

In this regard, Hyde departs more radically from the pluralist tradition than
D&W who still posit a normative goal for the law of the labour market, the
development of human capabilities. Hyde’s labour law truly is reduced to a set
of techniques for overcoming market failures, which like the pluralists, he
presumably sees as being endemic in labour markets.
While Hyde would limit labour law to overcoming market failures, he
does not embrace the neo-classical belief that the achievement of economic
efficiency or Pareto-optimality is the ultimate objective of public policy.
Indeed, he speaks more of the achievement of social optimality or social
efficiency than he does of economic efficiency, but neither term is defined
except as end states that could be achieved by the removal of the kinds of
labour market failures he previously identified. In the abstract, labour market
failures could favour employers and their removal would result in a
worsening of work conditions, but presumably Hyde shares the view of
pluralists that labour market failures disproportionately harm sellers of labour
rather than buyers, so that overcoming market failure will produce more
equity and voice, not less, even though that is no longer the explicitly stated
vocation of labour law.
The basis for this belief is to be found in Hyde’s use of game theory and,
in particular, the stag hunt, in which the best outcome for both parties is to
act cooperatively because any other strategy leaves both parties worse off.
This argument is developed more fully in another paper where Hyde provides a
gametheoretical defence of transnational labour standards.76 However, it is
clear that regulatory dilemmas are only avoided if the model of the stag hunt
applies. If not, then regulatory dilemmas recur. Thus, for Hyde the potential
domain of labour law can be divided in two: 1) labour laws that regulate against
the market and that produce severe regulatory dilemmas and 2) labour laws

that overcome market failures to produce optimal outcomes for both
parties and avoid regulatory dilemmas. This bifurcated view is captured in
Figure 5.
The crucial question for those who care about justice for workers, as
Hyde clearly does,77 is whether stag hunt games are the dominant paradigm of
worker– employer interaction in capitalist labour markets. If, however, justice
for workers is largely achieved by regulating against the market, then Hyde’s
switch to the stag hunt game is not worth the candle.
From an historical perspective, the claim that stag hunt games are the
dominant model of worker–employer interaction seems implausible given
the frequency and intensity of labour strife that has characterized most
advanced capitalist countries. It is not hard to see why. Let us take the goal of
overcoming workers’ collective action problems. Presumably, Hyde would
agree that historically this problem has been quite severe in most capitalist
countries most of the time, and particularly so in LMEs like the United States
and Canada. One reason why it has been so difficult for workers to organize is
that, in most circumstances, employers have found that high levels of workingclass atomization leave them better off

Figure 5. Hyde’s Analysis of Labour Law’s Recurring Regulatory Dilemmas.

economically than they would be if workers were well organized. This is
because in capitalist labour markets employers can generally depend on
competition between workers and the threat this poses to individual workers in
order to obtain worker cooperation without having to make considerable
concessions. As long as this condition holds, employer support for laws that
assist workers in overcoming their collective action problems is unlikely to be
forthcoming.
Hence, a renorming of labour law that makes overcoming workers’
collective action problems a key objective, will be just as vigorously
opposed by most employers most of the time as would a more traditional
labour law regime that pursues non-market values, like fairness, voice and
equality. Moreover, even if employer opposition to labour law promoting
worker collective action did not prevent legislation from being enacted, it
can be anticipated that it will be resisted, producing significant legal efficacy
problems of the type described by Hyde in his critique of protective labour
law. The history and recent trajectory of American collective bargaining
would seem to provide ample evidence for this less optimistic view.78
Similarly, a recent study by Catherine Casey concluded that despite the
aspiration in the European Union to achieve social citizenship, organizational
democracy and citizen–worker participation in workplaces are being
weakened by management’s preference for flexibility, intensified work and
decollectivized employment relations.79
In a more recent article that focuses on transnational labour standards,
Hyde also advocates a renorming based on overcoming collective action

problems in stag hunt games.80 Leaving aside the problem of moving from
individuals to states and the assumption that states can be counted upon
consistently to advance national long-term economic interests, rather than
sectoral, class or even personal ones,81 what is significant for present purposes
is Hyde’s recognition that not much of a regulatory agenda can be
generated for a transnational labour law renormed around stag hunts.82
Freedom of association comes off the table since Hyde recognizes that
countries can potentially gain a competitive advantage through repressive
labour laws. But what is left? Hyde’s best two regulatory objectives for a
renormed transnational law are the elimination of child labour and the
promotion of strong occupational health and safety laws. But even here the
evidence is not entirely convincing. Guy Davidov challenges Hyde’s claim that
child labour is never in the interest of developing country by arguing that
lower labour costs associated with the use of child labour may indeed attract
investment from the developed world. If that is the case, then it is not
axiomatically true that the long-term benefit of sending young children to school
will outweigh the shortterm benefit of attracting investment, and the
international stag hunt around the elimination of child labour may not
materialize.83
The claim that no country gains a comparative advantage from lower
occupational health and safety standards is arguably even weaker. The history
of occupational health and safety regulation in Canada illustrates the point.
When factory legislation was first proposed in the 1880s (combining
restrictions on child and female labour with general safety standards),
Canadian manufacturers objected to measures that copied American and
British standards on the ground that Canadian industries were much less well
established and could not operate under the same restrictions without

suffering serious damage.84 Put in modern parlance, they saw lower health
and safety standards as necessary to give infant Canadian industry a
competitive advantage over the more developed industries of the USA and
England.
In sum, Hyde’s proposal to renorm labour law around overcoming
collective action problems in stag hunt games is extremely problematic. In
order for this approach to produce a robust regulatory agenda, we have to make
the problematic assumption that stag hunt games are characteristic of actually
existing capitalist labour markets. Alternatively, if we drop that assumption for
both national labour markets and international trade, then labour law is left with
a very thin regulatory agenda indeed. Regulatory dilemmas are overcome by
giving up on most of labour law.

4. BRINGING CAPITALISM BACK IN: A NEO-MARXIST ACCOUNT OF LABOUR LAW’S
RECURRING REGULATORY DILEMMAS

It might be helpful to summarize the argument to this point. The concept
of recurring regulatory dilemmas is central to the neo-classical, Marxist and
pluralist theorizations of labour law, although each of these approaches has its
own analysis of the reasons why regulatory dilemmas arise and the space for
labour laws that avoid them. Arguably, that space has been narrowing since the
1980s, setting off a crisis in labour law. D&W and Hyde have each tried to
identify a new normative project for labour law that overcomes regulatory
dilemmas by making it consistent with the operation of labour markets. In
D&W’s case, the capabilities approach is said to meet this requirement because

it is market constituting, while in Hyde’s case consistency is met by limiting
labour law to the goal of overcoming collective action problems caused by
market failure. I have argued that the problem with both approaches is that they
fail to give analytic salience to the structural dynamics of capitalism. While that
might have been acceptable at a time when social democracy or Keynesian
welfare states had partially succeeded in domesticating capitalism by putting it
to work for social development, the resurgence of a more unbridled capitalism
over the past 30 years or so no longer allows it to remain a background
condition, assumed but without analytic significance.85 In D&W’s case, the
failure to take into account actually existing capitalism results in an overly
optimistic assessment of the prospects for advancing the capabilities agenda
within a largely untransformed capitalist market economy, while in Hyde’s
case, at least when applied to national labour law, it leads to an unrealistic
claim about the extent to which stag hunt games prevail in labour markets.86
The purpose of this section, then, is to suggest a way to bring capitalism
back into the analysis of regulatory dilemmas, but do so in a way that invites
rather than forecloses analysis of the historically specific conditions under
which conflict and cooperation between labour and capital occurs in capitalist
labour markets. The vehicle for this is an article by Erik Olin Wright on the
theoretical foundations of class compromise, which has not received much
attention in the labour law, industrial relations and political science literature
on regulatory dilemmas and their resolution.87 In this section, I will present a
summary of Wright’s argument, apply it to the theme of regulatory
dilemmas, and then argue that his model provides a more fruitful foundation
for thinking about the dynamics of regulatory dilemmas and the spaces for
overcoming them than do D&W or Hyde.
Wright’s central arguments are that within capitalism ‘a positive class

compromise—if

it

is

achievable—will

generally

constitute

the

most

advantageous context for the improvement of the life conditions of ordinary
people’ and that ‘the possibilities for stable, positive class compromise
generally hinge on the relationship between the associational power of the
working class and the material interests of capitalists’.88 He proposes that
instead of the constant inverse relationship between working-class interests and
capitalists’ interests postulated by classic Marxist theory, there is a curvilinear
reverse-J relationship (See Figure 6). According to this model, capitalist–class
interests are best satisfied when the working class is highly disorganized but
if working-class associational power advances to a certain level, employers
may find that their material interests are best advanced by cooperating with,
rather than opposing worker collective action—although their interests would
always be better served if working-class organization was returned to very low
levels. Wright also argues that if working class organization were to increase
even further to the point at which it had the capacity to threaten the right of
capitalists to control the allocation of capital, the space for positive
cooperation would disappear and employers would adopt an oppositional
stance. When so extended, the cooperation curve exhibits a roller-coaster
pattern

that

is

principally

shaped

by

the

extent

of

working-class

associational power and its impact on capitalist material interests.
Wright’s account

rests

on a game-theoretic

account of strategic

interactions between workers and capitalists informed by a Marxist
understanding of class power and interest. Wright identifies five possible
strategic games and pay-offs for workers and capitalists. The games are the
unilateral capitalist domination game, the conflict game, the prisoner’s
dilemma game, the assurance game (Hyde’s stag hunt) and the unilateral
worker domination game. As Wright notes, lurking

Figure 6. Traditional Marxist and Wright’s Models of Class Cooperation.

in the background of the models is the problem of power and he
hypothesizes that the impact of workers’ associational power on employers’
material interests can be thought of as determining which of these strategic
games is going to be played.89 Thus, an employer domination game is played
when weak workingclass organization enables employers to impose their
will without the need to make concessions in order to obtain working-class
cooperation. As working-class power increases, the game shifts to a pure
conflict game, since workers now have the power to inflict material harm on
employers if some of their demands are not met. This is the realm of negative
class compromises in which labour gains come at the expense of capitalist–
class interests. With further increases in working-class organization, the
strategic environment can shift toward an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game,
in which there is room for positive class compromise in the spheres of politics,
exchange and production.This occurs because worker organization may permit

capitalists to overcome some of their collective action problems, allowing them
to benefit from compromises made with working class organizations. The
stability of the positive compromise will depend in part on the extent to
which defectors can be detected and punished, which in turn may depend on
the degree of working-class strength. A strict assurance game is theoretically
possible, if the pay-off to both parties was greatest from mutual cooperation,
but according to Wright this condition is unlikely to be reached in capitalist
economies because employers are more likely to be better off in a world in
which they do not have to make concessions to gain employee cooperation.
However, there will be situations in which domination is not an available
alternative and a class conflict game is too costly, leading the parties to
cooperate. Even further increases in working-class power could push the game
toward one of unilateral worker domination in which workers can impose their
will on capital without needing its cooperation. At that point, the pay-off to
capital for cooperation would drop sharply, and capital would be expected to
fiercely resist any further erosion of its property rights, having nothing to
lose but the chains being imposed on it.
Finally, Wright adds an additional layer of analysis by bringing in
systemic and institutional constraints (Figure 7). Some results that might
be possible based entirely on the level of worker associational power and its
implications for employer interests become unattainable or more difficult to
achieve as a result of systemic and institutional arrangements that have been
created through previous rounds of conflict. Because these arrangements are
the product of historical forces, they should not be viewed as fixed, and may
indeed become the object of struggles for change, but their present existence
creates a framework that shapes and limits to some degree the strategic options
for each party.

Figure 7. Wright’s Model of Zones of Unattainability in Democratic
Capitalism.

While Wright is concerned with the issue of class cooperation in the spheres
of the labour market, production and politics, his model can be applied to
regulatory dilemmas, which as we noted earlier are defined as a zero-sum
games in which every gain for workers is accompanied by a corresponding loss
for employers. From his theory, it could be hypothesized that in a world where
workers had minimal associational power, particularly in the political
sphere, regulatory dilemmas would not be much of an issue, since there
would be little protective labour law. When workers’ associational power
increased to the point that labour could impose costs on employers,
protective legislation would develop, but the regime would be characterized
by recurring dilemmas, since each advance by workers would come at the

expense of employers’ material interests, with the outcome determined by
the relative strength of the labour and capital. Finally, Wright’s theory
predicts that if the working class grew stronger, regulatory dilemmas could be
overcome on condition that labour law not only protected workers but also
assisted employers to overcome their collective action problems and so did
not harm their material interests. However, the scope for such cooperation
would be predicted to be limited and contingent, so that recurring
regulatory dilemmas would be likely to re-emerge when employers saw the
opportunity to obtain higher material outcomes by exiting, evading or
dismantling the cooperative framework.
Wright’s Marxist model arguably offers a better foundation for thinking
about labour law’s regulatory dilemmas and the conditions under which they
can be resolved through positive compromise than either Hyde or D&W.
First, with regard to Hyde, we saw that the weakest link in his model was the
unsupported assertion that the stag hunt game characterizes some significant
portion of labour market interactions. The advantage of Wright’s model is
that it specifies a set of socio-economic conditions that determine which
strategic game will likely be the dominant one and explains why in capitalist
social formations stag hunt or assurance games are unlikely to emerge. While
an empirical investigation of Wright’s model is beyond the scope of this
paper, there are numerous examples that lend support Wright’s claim.Take for
instance, the case of Canadian collective agreement extension legislation passed
in several provinces in the 1930s. Basically, the law provided that the terms of a
collective agreement could be imposed on all workers and employers in a
particular industry in a particular region if it had acquired a predominant
significance. In practice, this meant that agreements were only extended
on the joint request of a union and major employers. Extension could

serve the interests of labour by reducing wage competition in a world in
which labour organization was weak and partial, but it could also serve the
interests of employers by stabilizing the industry and reducing what was
perceived to be harmful competition in a world in which barriers to entry
were low and employer organization weak. The law facilitated a form of
joint labour-management industrial regulation that operated to their mutual
benefit and was used successfully for many years in a few industries, such as
clothing manufacturing. In recent years, however, the scheme has been
breaking down, particularly in sectors exposed to global competition where
locally organized unions cannot help employers overcome their now much
greater collective action problems. As a result, in some provinces the law has
been weakened, while in others it has been repealed outright.90 Stories of
similar nature can be told around the breakdown of centralized collective
bargaining systems in many European countries. For example, sector-wide
collective bargaining in Germany was sustained by cooperation between
strong trade unions and employer associations where each party helped the
other overcome its collective action problems and maintain solidarity and
discipline. Since the 1980s, however, rising unemployment and international
competition have altered the conditions that sustained mutual cooperation,
leading to a breakdown of the system, leaving a shrinking core that is still
covered and a growing periphery that is not.91
Wright’s model also addresses a major weakness in D&W’s case, which is
that it treats the labour market as an institution that can be socially
engineered to improve its efficacy without taking into account the salience of
class power and class interests. Wright’s focus on class interests rather than on
aggregate welfare is supported by the recent intervention of Hall and Thelen in
the VoC literature, where they argue that the persistence of institutions does

not depend primarily on how well institutions increase aggregate welfare, but
rather on how institutions distribute costs and benefits and serve the interests
of the relevant actors, which in capitalist political economies puts employer
interests at the centre of the analysis.92 Whereas D&W’s positive case for a
capabilities approach depends on the existence of a happy coincidence of the
normatively desirable and the efficient, and on an unnamed agent capable of
its enactment, Wright provides a model that begins to specify the socioeconomic conditions that need to be present for the realization of a marketbased capabilities approach that delivered benefits to workers. This analytic shift
also entails a strategic shift from a politics premised on the existence of common
interest to one based on the achievement of solidarities needed to challenge
unequal power relations.93
Of course, like any model, Wright’s presents an oversimplified view of the
world. Moreover, given his particular objectives in that article, the model tends to
present the relation between associational strength and the resolution of recurring
dilemmas in a linear and static way. It is more useful—I think Wright would
agree—to view the relation between workers’ associational power and labour
law dialectically, with the understanding that its current resolution is the
product of past historical developments. One obvious implication of a
dialectical approach is that the development of labour law has no predetermined destination or direction. Neither Wright nor most contemporary
Marxists adhere to the view that the development of the forces of production will
inevitably bring about a transformation of relations of production that
strengthens workers’ organizational capacity and their ability to domesticate
capital. Labour law’s regulatory dilemmas will not be necessarily resolved over
time in ways that favour workers’ interests. Indeed, as we noted, much of the
current pessimism can be traced to the fact that the resolution of regulatory

dilemmas is shifting to the figurative left (political right).
More importantly, a dialectical approach would require Wright’s model
to present a more complex view of the relationship between labour law and
workers’ associational power. In its present formulation, his model suggests
that strong associational power should produce strong labour law, but we
know that while historically this has been true some of the time (eg, the
development of postWorld War II regimes), it is not true all the time (eg,
the use of repression to restore the status quo ante that was challenged by
labour demands and uprisings during and after World War I; conservative
labour relations policy in the UK from 1979 to 1997). At the very least, the
model would need to disaggregate the levels of workers’ associational power
in each of the spheres of the market, production and politics and consider the
implications of the particular combinations of associational strengths and
weaknesses for workers’ ability to advance their interests in politics, as well
as in market exchange and production.
Another concern is that the model suggests that there is a one-directional
cause and effect relationship between associational power and labour law.
However, looked at dialectically, there is a need to elaborate on the interactions
between the two, understanding that strong labour law may provide an
important foundation for establishing and maintaining workers’ associational
strength and that hostile laws may undermine the capacity of workers’ to
establish associational strength. This adds an element of dynamism to the
model which in its present form works better for a static analysis of the
existing moment. However, it is also important not to depart from the
dialectic either to pose labour law as autonomous from associational
strength and class power, as arguably D&W’s positive case for capabilities
does, or to make the opposite mistake of denying any autonomy to labour

law, or for that matter normative discourses regarding the appropriateness of
particular outcomes. Indeed, the strength of D&W’s argument is arguably in
the normative claims it makes for the capabilities approach rather than in
its positive case for it as common-interest, market constituting regulation.
Finally, Wright’s zones of attainability also need to be brought back into
the dialectic. In the current model, they appear to be completely
exogenous to associational strength and class power, limiting what is
presently attainable. But again, if the focus shifts from a static to a dynamic
analysis, then we need to more fully explore the creation of those zones as a
product of past struggles and the possibility that they too become objects of
contention leading to a shift in what is possible. Recent transformations of
industrial relations systems in the UK, Germany and USA provide good
examples of the ways in which outcomes which might at one point have been
thought to be unattainable have been reclaimed as available ground by
aggressive employer action in evading, avoiding and ultimately abandoning
previously established legal and institutional constraints.94

5. CONCLUSION

The objective of this paper is to develop a better understanding of labour
law’s recurring regulatory dilemmas by clarifying how they have been
theoretically constructed in three theoretical frameworks (neo-classical, Marxist
and pluralist), by critically examining two recent attempts to overcome the
problem of regulatory dilemmas by renorming labour law around capabilities
(D&W) or collective action problems (Hunt) and by bringing back in a

Marxist analysis of unequal power relations in capitalism (Wright) that does
not preclude positive compromise as a way of resolving regulatory dilemmas.
The paper’s strongest claim is that those who wish to renorm labour law
around a project that overcomes the regulatory dilemmas historically
generated by labour law’s traditional protective agenda and still generate a
regime that is beneficial to workers’ interests cannot do so by ignoring,
marginalizing or naturalizing the property and social relations that
characterize capitalist labour markets.
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